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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OP UTAH/ ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent/ 
vs. 
KENNETH EUGENE WYNIA, 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
l BRIEF OF 
I Case No. 
1 Category 
APPELLANT 
870113-CA 
No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was defendant denied a fair trial due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel? 
2. Was defendant entrapped into committing the offenses 
charged? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in admitting exhibits into 
evidence where the chain of custody had not been 
fully established? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with four counts of violation of 
§ 58-37-8 (Addendum 1/ 2), distribution of a controlled substance 
for value/ two counts in second degree for cocaine and two counts 
in the third degree for marijuana (R. 2-3). Prior to trial 
defendant made a motion to claim entrapment as a defense pursuant 
to § 76-2-303/ U.C.A. (R. 10; Addendum 2). On the day called for 
trial/ the Court heard testimony on the issue of entrapment (Tr. 
38). Defense counsel called the state's chief witnesses in 
support of his contention that defendant had been entrapped (Tr. 
-1-
38/ 53). Defense counsel called no other witnesses and submitted 
his motion without argument (Tr. 58). After the Court denied the 
motion/ defense counsel told the Court that the main reason he 
brought the entrapment motion was so that he could raise the 
issue before the jury (Tr. 58). 
Two police officers who were working as undercover 
agents for the Metro Narcotics Strike Force in Tooele County were 
the state's chief witnesses (Tr. 75/ 78/ 130-31). Detective 
Celeste Paquette testified that she arid Officer Patricia Pusey 
went to Tooele on January 3# 1986 and stopped at a bowling alley 
called Harris Lanes (Tr. 79-80). While she was playing pool she 
met a person called Tony (Tr. 80). They began talking about 
"partying" and types of drugs available (Tr. 80-1). Detective 
Paquette told him she'd like some marijuana "tonight" and Tony 
told her he could get some (Tr. 81; note: pages 81 and 82 are 
filed out of sequence between Tr. 94 and 95). Tony went across 
the room and brought back a man whom he introduced as Ken (Tr. 
81). The three of them discussed the purchase of a quarter ounce 
of marijuana (Tr. 82). Tony told her the cost would be $30 and 
took $30 from her (Tr. 82). Both Tony and Ken left the bar and 
returned about an hour later (Tr. 82). Ken then asked Detective 
Paquette for a ride to the Sandbagger Lounge and she agreed to 
give him one (Tr. 82-3). Officer Pusey and Detective Paquette 
drove to the lounge with Ken and Toi.y (Tr. 83). She testified 
that while seated in her car in the lounge's parking lot Ken 
passed her a baggie of marijuana (Tr. 83). 
At trial Detective Paquette identified the defendant as 
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the person she met known as "Ken" (Tr. 79-80). 
Officer Pusey testified that she went to the bowling 
alley in Tooele with Detective Paquette on January 3# 1986 (Tr. 
131). She met the defendant while playing pool (Tr. 131-32). 
After a short conversation about "partying"/ she asked him if he 
could get her some cocaine (Tr. 132). Detective Pusey testified 
that she first mentioned drugs and asked defendant if he could 
get some for her (Tr. 135). She said defendant told her he would 
get what he could and then left the bar with a person called Tony 
(Tr. 132). When he returned he asked for a ride to the 
Sandbagger Lounge (Id.). As they walked to the police officers1 
car the defendant handed her a small bindle and she gave him $40 
(Tr. 132/ 142-43). Detective Paquette/ on the other hand 
testified that she saw Ken pass Officer Pusey a small bindle 
while they were in the car driving to the Sandbagger (Tr. 88). 
On January 10/ 1986 the two officers went to the 
Sandbagger Lounge in Tooele (Tr. 90). Detective Paquette 
testified that after they started playing pool the defendant 
approached them and began talking (Tr. 90). She said that he 
asked Officer Pusey if she wanted more cocaine (Tr. 90)/ while 
Officer Pusey testified she initiated the conversation about 
purchasing drugs (Tr. 146)/ Detective Paquette admitted she asked 
defendant first about getting her some more marijuana (Tr. 91). 
He tol£ her that she should wait and he would take her to get 
some (Tr. 92). They later drove in Paquette's car to a trailer 
park in Tooele (Tr. 94). The defendant introduced her to a woman 
named Sherry in one of the trailers (Tr. 94). She said she had 
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marijuana to sell and gave Detective Paquette a baggie for $45 
(Tr. 94). Defendant witnessed the transaction (Tr. 94). 
Officer Pusey testified that on January 10/ 1986 she 
asked defendant if he could get her some cocaine (Tr. 137). He 
agreed and made some phone calls (Tr. 137). He then came back to 
her and introduced her to a person named Matt (Tr. 137). Matt 
sold her a bindle of cocaine for $35 he had gotten from someone 
else (never identified) at the bar (Tr. 138). Paquette and Pusey 
testified that they drank alcoholic beverages on both occasions 
(Tr. 99/ 104/ 146-47). Pusey testified that it was possible that 
she or Detective Paquette had purchased beer for the defendant on 
both January 3 and 10 (Tr. 149-50). 
Paquette and Pusey testified that the suspected 
narcotics were transported to the Salt Lake city evidence room/ 
sealed and dropped into the night deposit room (Tr. 84-5/ 95/ 
133/ 139). Earl Price with Metro Narcotics testified that he 
retrieved the exhibits from the evidence room/ transported them 
to the State toxicology lab/ gave them to David Murdock at the 
lab and picked them up from Terrance Weaver (Tr. 117/ 121-27). 
Both Murdock and Weaver are criminalists for the state toxicology 
lab (Tr. 129). Mr. Weaver and Kevin Smith testified as to the 
tests they ran on the evidence (Tr. 156-58/ 169-72). Mr. Murdock 
did not testify. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of 
the drug exhibits on the basis that the chcin of custody had not 
been established (Tr. 164-65/ 176). The Court overruled his 
objection and the exhibits were admitted (Tr. 165/ 176). 
At the close of the state's case/ defense counsel 
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rested without calling any witnesses (Tr. 177). Defense counsel 
never questioned the officers about the discrepancies in their 
testimony (Tr. 97-113/ 142-47). The defense of entrapment was 
argued to the jury and presented in jury instructions (Tr. 
189-91, R. 33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant was denied a fair trial through the 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Although entrapment had been 
raised as a defense, counsel never questioned the discrepancies 
in the testimony of the state's chief witnesses nor did he 
highlight for the jury the acts of the undercover officers which 
constituted entrapment. In the entrapment hearing before the 
Court prior to trial he did not argue the applicable law and 
facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the Court. 
Further, he failed to point out the weakness in the chain of 
custody to the jury once the Court had admitted the challenged 
exhibits into evidence. 
2. Defendant was entrapped into committing the 
offenses charged due to the tactics of the undercover officers. 
The officers did not know defendant prior to their first contact 
with him on January 3, 1987. They admitted initiating the 
conversations with him concerning the purchase of narcotics. One 
of them also conceded that they possibly bought him drinks. 
3. The chain of custody for the state's exhibits of 
alleged narcotics involved in the transactions with defendant was 
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not completely established.. The state crime lab criminalist 
(David Murdock) who accepted custody of all four exhibits from 
the police officer who obtained them from the police evidence 
locker did not testify. The two criminalists who did test the 
exhibits offered into evidence did not testify that they received 
the alleged contraband from Mr. Murdock. The evidence should 
thus have been excluded. 
ARGUMENT 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DENIED 
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL 
As a result of the ineffective assistance of his 
counsel at trial/ defendant was denied the right to counsel 
guaranteed by Article 1/ § 12 of the Utah Constitution and by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
(Addendum 3). The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that in 
order to challenge a conviction on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel/ 
it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner/ and (2) that the outcome of the 
trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error. 
state v. Geary/ 707 P.2d 645/ ^46 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
An accused in a criminal case has "the right to have 
competent counsel who will take such actions and present whatever 
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defenses and interpose whatever objections he can in honesty and 
good conscience justify in the interest of his client." State v. 
Gray/ 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979) (fn. omitted). 
In a case where entrapment is raised as a defense/ the 
discrepancy in testimony between state's witnesses is 
particularly important. However/ defense counsel never 
questioned Paquette and Pusey regarding the discrepancy as to 
when the defendant allegedly gave cocaine to Pusey on January 3. 
Pusey testified that he gave it to her in the bowling alley 
parking lot on the way to the car (Tr. 132/ 142-43). Paquette 
testified that he gave it to Pusey while in the car driving to 
the Sandbagger (Tr. 88). Further/ he did not note the 
discrepancy between the officers1 testimony as to who first 
initiated the discussion regarding cocaine on January 10. Pusey 
said she did (Tr. 146)/ while Paquette said the defendant did 
(Tr. 90). 
In addition/ he failed to highlight/ in closing 
argument/ the acts of the officers which constituted the acts of 
entrapment (Tr. 189-91)/ nor did he even discuss the applicable 
law and facts before the Court ruled against him (Tr. 58). 
Counsel also erred in not pointing out the weakness in 
the chain of custody for the narcotics to the jury after the 
Court admitted it into evidence. One of the custodians of the 
narcotics/Dave Murdock did not testify at trial. Nevertheless/ 
the Court admitted the narcotics into evidence over defense 
counselfs objection. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
[a] weak link in the chain [of custody] and any doubt 
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created by it go to the weight of the evidence once the 
trial court has exercised the discretion to conclude 
that in reasonable probability the preferred evidence 
has not been changed in any important respect. 
State Ve Bradshaw/ 680 P.2d 1036/ 1039 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). It was thus defense counsel's duty to point out the 
weakness in the evidence to the jury. 
The first part of the Geary test has been satisfied 
since defendant has demonstrated above that trial counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner. As 
to whether the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different since the police officers were the main witnesses 
against defendant/ their credibility was a crucial element of the 
state's case. Defense counsel's failure to closely question them 
and point out their discrepancies in testimony/ left the jury 
with no challenge to their credibility. The chain of custody for 
the physical evidence against defendant was flawed/ yet defense 
counsel never pointed this out to the jury. Since the issue of 
entrapment was crucial to the defense's case/ counsel's failure 
to highlight to the jury the acts of the officers which 
constituted entrapment was prejudicial/ and/ complied with the 
other deficiencies noted above/ clearly affected the outcome of 
the trial. 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED INTO COMMITTING 
THE OFFENSES CHARGED 
The drug transactions of which defendant was accused 
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and convicted all occurred as the result of contacts made by 
female undercover agents in a social setting. The agents 
admitted that in these situations they tried to blend in with the 
other people at the bar (Tr. 113). Not only did they consume 
alcoholic beverages on these occasions/ but they also purchased 
such beverages for defendant and others. Each time they were the 
ones who initiated the conversations about partying and asked if 
defendant could get drugs for them. Also# they had never met 
defendant prior to January 3/ 1987/ so they had no reason to 
suspect he was involved in the distribution of narcotics when 
they first began talking to him. 
Regarding the defense of entrapment/ § 76-2-303(1) 
states: 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped 
into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a 
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
§ 76-2-303/ U.C.A. (1953/ as amended 1973) (Addendum 2). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "only police 
conduct that 'entraps1 those ready and willing to commit the 
crime is acceptable." State v. Cripps/ 692 P.2d 747/ 750 (Utah/ 
1984). 
In assessing police conduct under the objective 
standard/ the test to determine an unlawful entrapment 
is whether a law enforcement official or an agent/ in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission of an 
offense/ induced the defendant to commit such an 
offense by persuasion or inducement which would be 
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effective to persuade an average person/ other than one 
who was merely given the opportunity to commit the 
offense. 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based 
primarily on sympathy/ pity/ or close personal 
friendship/ or offers of inordinate sums of money/ are 
examples/ depending on an evaluation of the 
circumstances in each case/ of what might constitute 
prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the course of 
conduct between the government representative and the 
defendant/ the transactions leading up to the offense/ 
the interaction between the agent and the defendant/ 
and the response to the inducements of the agent/ are 
all to be considered in judging what effect the 
governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal 
person. 
State v. Taylor/ 599 P.2d 496/ 503 (Utah, 1979) (fn. omitted). 
Here/ as in State v. Kourbelas/ 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 
1980) and State v. Sprague/ 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984)/ the 
undercover officers had no reason to suspect that defendant was 
involved in the drug trade. Instead/ they went to a bar/ drank 
beer and played pool in order to fit in (Tr. 113). They also in 
all likelihood purchased beer for the defendant once they had met 
him. The officers initiated conversations about "partying" and 
the use of drugs and admitted that on each occasion they asked 
the defendant if he could get drugs for them. Also/ the officers 
were female and in all likelihood their sex assisted in making 
the acquaintance of defendant and others at the bar (Tr. 51). 
Detective Paquette said she and Officer Pusey had a cover story 
prepared to cut off any sexual advances (Id.). 
In State v. Kaufman/ 734 P.2d 465 [Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court held that defendant had been entrapped where the 
female undercover officer used her attractiveness and relative 
youthfulness to become defendant's friend and to induce the 
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defendant to purchase supposedly stolen merchandise. Id,, at 468. 
Here the officers used similar tactics to "fit in" at the bowling 
alley/ and induce him to obtain drugs for them. Such police 
tactics cannot be condoned as a matter of public policy. 
The police entrapment of January 3 continued to January 
10. In State v. Taylor/ supra/ the Supreme Court held that 
defendant had been entrapped into distributing drugs for value on 
two occasions — September 27 and October 4, 1977 (599 P.2d 
497-98). The transactions were thus separated by a week/ yet the 
Court ascribed the same motives to defendant on each date and 
dismissed both convictions. Here/ the social context and 
contacts were virtually identical/ with the officers again 
initiating the conversations regarding the purchase of drugs. 
Under the facts and case law discussed above/ the trial 
court erred in not ruling that defendant had been entrapped as a 
matter of law. 
THE STATE'S NARCOTICS EXHIBITS SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WHERE THE CHAIN OF 
CUSTODY WAS NOT FULLY ESTABLISHED 
David Murdock/ a criminalist with the state toxicology 
laboratory/ received the suspected narcotics from Officer Price 
for testing (Tr. 126-27). Tests **ere performed by other 
criminalists/ who testified at the trial. Mr. Murdock did not 
testify as to his custody of the contraband; no testimony was 
received as to whether Mr. Murdock's initials or other indication 
-11-
of custodianship appeared on the suspected contraband tested by 
Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith. Neither Weaver nor Smith testified 
that they received the contraband (State's Exhibits 1 through 4) 
from Mr. Murdock. 
It is a general rule that before physical evidence may 
be received in evidence/ the party offering it must lay 
a foundation. It must be identified as the object in 
question and there must be shown a chain of custody. 
This is particularly true of narcotics which are 
susceptible to alteration or substitution. 
State v. Petralia, 110 Ariz. 530/ 521 P.2d 617/ 623 (1974) 
(emphasis added)/ cited with approval in State v. Watson/ 684 
P.2d 39/ 40 (Utah 1980). 
In State v. Madsen/ 28 Utah 2d 108/ 498 P.2d 670 
(1972)/ the Supreme Court examined a chain of custody argument. 
In upholding admission of narcotics into evidence/ the Court 
noted that "each of the persons who had custody of the exhibit 
one time or another testified to their possession and their 
disposition of it until it was finally offered in evidence." 498 
P.2d at 672. 
Before a physical object or substance connected with 
the commission of a crime is admissible in evidence 
there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is in 
substantially the same condition as at the time of a 
crime. The circumstances surrounding the preservation 
and custody of the article and the likelihood of 
tampering are factors to be considered in determining 
its admissibility. 
498 P.2d at 672. 
Here the evidence sought to be introduced/ narcotics/ 
is easily subject to alteration or substitution. The State 
failed to establish the chain of custody since it did not present 
any evidence that the exhibits sought to be introduced were in 
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fact the same narcotics that had been given to Mr. Murdock by 
Officer Price. The trial court thus abused its discretion when 
it admitted State's Exhibits 1 through 4 into evidence over 
defense counsel objections. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully asks the Court to reverse his 
convictions in this case for the reason^discussed above. 
Dated t h i s ^9> ^/d&y tft S8fc#6mber^ 
Margo Lv' James f\ 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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Addendum 1 
KEITH F. OEHLER 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
Tooele County Courthouse 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: 882-5550, Ext. 351 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INFORMATION 
Circuit Court No. /*SdotLo OOS 
District Court No. 
The undersigned /vVjsiy/* ,^r / /7 , j / ) i>?NA/ under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of 
January, 1986, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the said KENNETH E. 
WYNIA knowingly and intentionally distributed for value, agreed, 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute for value, or possessed 
with intent to distribute for value, a controlled substance, to-wit: 
marijuana. 
COUNT II: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of 
January, 1986, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the said KENNETH E. 
WYNIA knowingly and intentionally distributed for value, agreed, 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute for value, or possessed 
with intent to distribute for value, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, to-wit: cocaine. 
COUNT III: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: That on or about the 10th day 
of January, 1986, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the said KENNETH E. 
WYNIA knowingly and intentionally distributed for value, agreed, 
C00002 
m t i i H 11 ur u i an, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Js 
KENNETH E ^ WYNIA 
DOB: 08-18-55 
TAoeU. tWY, . Def endant . 
i n c o i n i t. ur u m n V J , I M . I H I I . I I I i. • n I n JL n 
Information 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute for value, or possessed 
with intent to distribute for value, a controlled substance, to-wit: 
marijuana. 
COUNT IV: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: That on or about the 10th day 
of January, 1986, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the said KENNETH E. 
WYNIA knowingly and intentionally distributed for value, agreed, 
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute for value, or possessed 
with intent to distribute for value, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, to-wit: cocaine. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: On each of the aforesaid dates, 
confidential informants purchased or witnessed the purchase of a white 
powdery substance and a brown coarse substance, from the above-
referenced Defendant. Subsequent analyses by the State Crime Lab of 
the white substance purchased determined that the substance was, in 
fact, cocaine; and of the brown substance purchased, that it was, in 
fact, marijuana. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Frank Scharmann and Lance Sutherland. 
COMPLAINANT 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / 7 day of 
J c A K r , 1986. 
Addendum 2 
Utah Code Annotated , 1953 as amended 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is .unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to produce, manufacture, .or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) to possess a controlled substance in the course of his business 
as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
stances listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or 
prescription; 
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to negotiate to have a controlled 
substance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, 
or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, sub-
stance, or material instead of the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
G>) Any person who violates Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules [Schedule] I or II is, upon 
conviction, guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedules* HI and [or] IV, or mari-
huana is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this Subsection 
(l)(b)(ii) is guilty of a second degree felony; 
76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that the actor was en-
trapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law en-
forcement officer or a person directed by or acting in co-operation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or 
threatening, bodily injury is an element of the offense charged a ad the 
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a 
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the 
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evi-
dence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether 
the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion 
shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause 
shown may permit & later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the de-
fendant was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant 
to the jury at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on en-
trapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of en-
trapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted 
except that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at 
a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
Addendum 3 
Utah Constitution, Article I 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
* be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense* 
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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